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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 August 1951

DRAFT

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN DREAKING OFF THE KAESONG NEGOTIATIONS

PROBLEM:

negotiations were from the outset intended primarily to gain time for the preparation of a new and perhaps larger scale Communist offensive in Korea. SE-9 has examined the probable military consequences of a breakdown of the Kaesong talks. Recent intelligence reinforces the conclusions of that estimate. During recent weeks the preparations of Communist forces in the Korean area have continued. Several unconfirmed reports indicate Communist plans to renew the offensive should the cease

2. The Communists must realize the probability that a resumption

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fire negotiations fail



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of hostilities in Korea will lead to expansion of the war by the US, with the consequent increase danger of general war. We believe it unlikely that the USSR is willing to accept serious risk of general war solely for the sake of attaining its objectives in Korea. We therefore conclude that even though the Kaesong talks have been broken off, there is a real likelihood that the Communists will attempt to reopen the cease fire negotiations in the near future, probably on a political rather than a military level.

3. The forthcoming visit of Gromyko to New York and Washington may have been planned to coincide with the obviously fabricated charges of UN/US bad faith at Kaesong. Gromyko may attempt through a public statement, or through conversations at the UN, or through private negotiations with State Department officials, to discuss the Korean situation in a larger setting. Rupture of the cease fire talks at Kaesong would perhaps give greater leverage to his efforts.